Mifare cracker
Sector 02 - FOUND_KEY Sector 02 - UNKNOWN_KEY Sector 01 - FOUND_KEY Sector 01 - UNKNOWN_KEY Sector 00 - FOUND_KEY Sector 00 - UNKNOWN_KEY Symbols: '.' no key found, '/' A key found, '\' B key found, 'x' both keys found Try to authenticate to all sectors with default keys. Other possible matches based on ATQA & SAK values:
#Mifare cracker plus
* MIFARE Plus (4 Byte UID or 4 Byte RID) 4K, Security level 1 So we can read the output of our NFC reader.įingerprinting based on MIFARE type Identification Procedure: You can use any other Linux distribution than Kaliīut I recommend it or any other Debian-based distribtion.īefore getting into the hardware part, we need to configure our operating system To perform this attack, you will need a computer running Kali Linux, a PN532 NFC/RFID controller breakout board
#Mifare cracker crack
Since then, a lot of publicĮxploits to crack MIFARE Classic tags have been developed. Of an OV-Chipkaart which is using MIFARE Classic chip. Research group of the Radboud University Nijmegen made public that they performedĪ complete reverse-engineering and were able to clone and manipulate the contents Then, in 2008, In March 2008 the Digital Security First, Nohl and Plötz presented at Computing Community ConsortiumĪ partial reverse engineering Crypto-1 (the cryptography used by MIFARE Classic tags), The challenge is to crack the keys to get read and write access to the tag.įortunately - or unfortunately - the MIFARE tags security has been compromised There is a lot more to learn in this documentĭue to the fact that the MIFARE 4K isn't a secure product, finding an exploitĭidn't take long. TheĪccess bits also specify the type (data or value) of the data blocks. The access conditions for the blocks of that sector are stored in bytes 6.9. Sector access conditions and the secret keys: A (mandatory) and B (optional). The sector trailer is the last block (block 3) in one sector.Įach sector has a sector trailer. 1920 bytes are available for general storage of user data.128 bytes are reserved for keys and access control settings.
1520 bytes are available for general storage of user data.512 bytes are reserved for keys and access control settings.16 bytes are reserved for manufacturer data (this is called UID or Block 0).An area of 8 Sectors of 256 bytes (16 blocks) each (zone B).An area of 32 Sectors of 64 bytes (4 blocks) each (zone A).I had done the research before findingĪn exploit and learned a lot of stuff that weren't needed to crack the tagĪ MIFARE 4K Classic memory embed 4096 bytes of EEPROM divided into 2 main areas: Since this is a project where the goal is to learn, I find it interesting to You can read more about this lack of security in these articles:
As such only free-read data elements should be held on this platform.". Is a low-end memory technology and should be considered to provide only minimal
To what is written in the specs : "The MIFARE 4K platform The tag appeared to be a MIFARE 4K from the MIFARE Classic Family, these tagsĪre pretty common for this kind of applications, which is quite sad regarding Which is able to provide basic information on tags and more if they are not secured. Responsible for the use you will make of the knowledge I provide.įirst of all, I had to find what kind of NFC tag was used by the card. This article is only about explaining how unsecure this payment method is. Please remember you are not allowed to add money you don't own to this kind of cards. So started my project to hack this card and determine either it was secure or not. The most obvious solution I thought about was that everything
To me that there were no server to manage your account so I wanted to know how Your account, getting identified thanks to your badge. Work with the same payment system: either you add coins or you can recharge Hacking a MIFARE 4K payment card | Aymeric GAILLARDĪt work there are some snack vending machines as well as coffee machines.